Indiana Law Journal
Volume 93
Issue 1 The Future of the U.S. Constitution: A
Symposium

Article 6

Winter 2018

The "Lower" Federal Courts: Judging in a Time of Trump
Nancy Gertner
Harvard Law School, ngertner@law.harvard.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, and the Judges Commons

Recommended Citation
Gertner, Nancy (2018) "The "Lower" Federal Courts: Judging in a Time of Trump," Indiana Law Journal:
Vol. 93 : Iss. 1 , Article 6.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol93/iss1/6

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open
access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository
@ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

The “Lower” Federal Courts: Judging in a Time of Trump*
JUDGE NANCY GERTNER (RET.)†
The scenes that unfolded in courtrooms across the country in the days and weeks
after the inauguration of President Trump were unfamiliar to me, even though I had
been a United States district judge for seventeen years. The new President had announced a “travel ban” shortly after taking office.1 The ban was wideranging. It suspended entry of foreign nationals from seven countries for 90 days,2 halted the U.S.
refugee resettlement program for 120 days,3 indefinitely suspended resettlement of
Syrian refugees,4 reduced the cap on the number of refugees that can be accepted into
the United States,5 and suggested that Christians and others from minority religions
be granted priority over Muslims.6 The policy, reportedly drafted without input from
key officials and lawmakers,7 went into effect immediately, sweeping within it visa
holders and lawful permanent residents, some in midflight to the United States. It
was immediately challenged in district courts across the country; one entered a national injunction.8 In short order, the Ninth Circuit denied the Government’s emergency motion for a stay pending appeal.9
Rather than continuing to litigate the original order, the Government revoked it
and issued a new one. A second ban was implemented10—this time apparently with
the help of government lawyers.11 It dropped Iraq from the list of targeted countries,12
exempted legal permanent residents and valid visa holders,13 removed the indefinite
restriction on the admission of Syrian refugees,14 and omitted the language offering
preferential status to persecuted religious minorities.15 Yet, despite the changes, the
revised ban was again enjoined by district courts in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits16

* Copyright © 2018 Nancy Gertner.
† U.S. District Court Judge, D. Mass. (Retired); Senior Lecturer Harvard Law School;
Of Counsel, Fick & Marx.
1. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
2. Id. § 3(c).
3. Id. § 5(a), (d).
4. Id. § 5(c).
5. Id. § 5(d).
6. See id. § 5(e).
7. Ron Nixon, Travel Ban Caught Homeland Security by Surprise, Report Concludes,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/19/us/politics/homelandsecurity-travel-ban-inspector-general.html [https://perma.cc/STD6-RDKG].
8. Washington v. Trump, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash., Feb. 3, 2017).
9. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017).
10. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).
11. Ariane de Vogue & Tal Kopan, New Trump Travel Ban Order Nearing Completion,
CNN (Feb. 21, 2017, 9:16 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/20/politics/trump-newexecutive-order-immigration/index.html [https://perma.cc/2V9J-TG78].
12. Exec. Order No. 13,780 § 1(g)–(i), 82 Fed. Reg. at 13,211–12.
13. Id. § 3(b).
14. Id. § 6(a).
15. Compare Exec. Order No. 13,769 § 5(e), 82 Fed. Reg. at 8979, with Exec. Order No.
13,780 § 3(c), 82 Fed. Reg. at 13,214–15.
16. Hawaii v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Haw 2017) (entering preliminary
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and upheld by their respective courts of appeals.17 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari, put the case on the October 2017 calendar, and lifted the bans with some
exceptions.18 The Court held that a travel ban could only apply to refugees and travelers without a “bona fide” relationship to a person or entity in the United States.19
It was an unfamiliar scene to me on a number of levels: The plaintiffs requested
a preliminary injunction, an area which the Supreme Court acknowledged involved
“an exercise of discretion and judgment.”20 In determining whether to issue an injunction, a court is charged with balancing the equities—the irreparable harm to the
parties if the ban were implemented or to the government if it were suspended, the
public interest which was arguably implicated on both sides of the case, and the likelihood of success on the merits of the claim.21 The outcome was not a foregone conclusion: On the one hand, the executive bans were stunning in their breadth and in
the speed with which they were issued—with little or no process let alone attention
to detail. The comments made by the President while campaigning strongly suggested religious and national origin discrimination had motivated the implementation
of the bans. On the other hand, the bans concerned an area in which the President
had substantial independent authority, namely, his significant power to set national
security priorities and to exercise control over national borders.
In ordinary times, I would have expected a different result. Since a preliminary
injunction is all about deference and judgment, I would have expected courts to defer
to the President in a host of ways, to trivialize the irreparable harm to the plaintiffs,
and to dramatize the costs to national security. I am not suggesting that that would
have been the correct result—on the contrary—only that it would have been a typical
one.
The reaction of the lower courts to the travel ban, no matter what the party affiliation of the judge or who the appointing authority was, made me consider whether
judging in 2017, what I call “judging in a time of Trump,” will look different than
the judging I was used to. I had been a U.S. district judge for seventeen years, from
1994 to 2011; I am in the process of writing about that experience.
There is substantial literature about the role of context in judicial decision making.22 Context could mean considering the relative positions of power of parties in a

injunction); Hawaii v. Trump 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, (D. Haw. 2017) (entering temporary
restraining order); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, (D. Md.
2017).
17. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam); Int’l Refugee Assistance
Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017).
18. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Hawaii, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) (per
curiam).
19. Id. at 2088.
20. Id. at 2087.
21. See id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 65.
22. See, e.g., BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 103–
04 (1921); Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4–5 (1983); Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In
Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597 (1990). See generally Trinyan Mariano, Legal Realism and
the Rhetoric of Judicial Neutrality: Richard Wright’s Challenge to American Jurisprudence,
1 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 467, 472 (2012).
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lawsuit, examining the actual impact of a judicial decision, or looking at the case
through an even broader lens, namely the political context of the litigation.23 To use
the most graphic example, judging in a time of war is arguably different from judging
in peace time—different balances, different considerations.
What was the context in which the travel ban decisions were made? The bans
were the work of a President that—at least from the media—appeared to have no
appreciation of constitutional checks and balances, let alone the role of the courts.
He questioned the impartiality of Judge Gonzalo Curiel, then presiding over a case
against Trump University because of Curiel’s “Mexican heritage” even though Judge
Curiel was born in Indiana.24 He had no sense of the limits of his own authority. He
has threatened to withhold funds from so-called sanctuary cities, notwithstanding
congressional directives and Tenth Amendment limitations.25 He has been accused
not simply of flouting constitutional rules but also constitutional norms.26 He reportedly suggested that the head of the FBI, a somewhat autonomous agency, was supposed to be “loyal” to him.27 The challenges to checks and balances, to the separation
of powers, even to elementary notions of federalism, were not abstract but concrete,
not aberrant but systemic.
Do these considerations figure into the process of judging in a time of Trump,
especially in cases like the travel ban preliminary injunction cases where judicial
discretion and judgment is explicitly involved? My question is not the narrow one,
about the admission of certain kinds of evidence, namely, whether courts evaluating
the travel ban could consider what Trump had said on the campaign trail. It is about
whether judging at a time when the systems of government seem to be working for
the most part, looks different from judging when there is a concern of real executive
overreach. The ordinary work of judging involves judgment at all levels; contrary to
the legal formalists, the law does not enforce itself. Choice is everywhere as Justice
Cardozo described: “There is nothing that can relieve us of the pain of choosing at
every turn.”28 And in that work—those choices, that balancing, the exercise of that
discretion, the interpretation of often ambiguous provisions and decisional law that

23. Larry DiMatteo, Reason and Context: A Dual Track Theory of Interpretation, 109
PENN. ST. L. REV. 397 (2004); Minow & Spelman, supra note 22, at 1598–99, 1602–03.
24. Nina Totenberg, Who Is Judge Gonzalo Curiel, the Man Trump Attacked for His
Mexican Ancestry?, NPR (June 7, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/06/07/481140881/whois-judge-gonzalo-curiel-the-man-trump-attacked-for-his-mexican-ancestry [https://perma
.cc/42AB-CQC7].
25. Darla Cameron, How Sanctuary Cities Work, and How Trump’s Stalled Executive
Order Might Affect Them, WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/graphics/national/sanctuary-cities [https://perma.cc/JWU7-KK54].
26. Adam Liptak, Donald Trump Could Threaten U.S. Rule of Law, Scholars Say, N.Y.
TIMES (June 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/04/us/politics/donald-trumpconstitution-power.html [https://perma.cc/XD8W-87YM].
27. Massimo Calabresi, Donald Trump’s Loyalty Pledge for the FBI Challenges the
Nation, TIME (June 8, 2017), http://time.com/4810490/donald-trump-fbi-loyalty-pledge
[https://perma.cc/92LY-MBM4].
28. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924), reprinted in SELECTED
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 185 (Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947) (discussing how
courts cannot escape the obligation and pain of choosing).
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judges must do—does the Trump context play a role, explicitly or not? More important, should it?
To be sure, I offer only preliminary thoughts in this Essay. The Trump presidency
is young. There are multiple challenges to multiple executive decisions and orders in
courts across the country. A full treatment would take the reader into the robust literature on judicial decision making about context and pragmatism, with historical
comparisons to other epochs where the challenges were comparable, even to empirical analyses of judging at different periods of time.
I start with judging in “ordinary” times, the period during which I served. I then
describe the challenges of judging in a time of Trump, and I conclude by illuminating
the implications of those challenges perhaps for judicial education, law schools, and
advocacy.
JUDGING IN “ORDINARY” TIMES
The “lower” federal courts are not just the way stations you have to pass through
the get to the Supreme Court. They are—or are at least supposed to be—common
law courts considering new constitutional issues on the merits, prefiguring arguments
that may one day be appealed to the Supreme Court, and shaping the way justice is
actually delivered in the vast majority of cases.
Too often lower federal courts have behaved otherwise, in what I have called
“duck, avoid, or evade.”29 They have resorted to a host of doctrines that narrow access to justice and they have created a set of procedural trip wires to avoid dealing
with substantive issues on the merits. In so doing, they have reduced certain kinds of
cases—notably, civil rights cases and police misconduct litigation—to kabuki rituals
in which the plaintiffs, and plaintiffs alone, regularly lose long before trial. As I
wrote:
These were pressures—or better yet incentives—that cut across the usual
political and ideological lines other scholars have written about. While
they were presented to us as efficiency measures, and neutral in their
impact, they in fact affected the way the job of judging was done, and,
advertently or inadvertently, the outcomes. Indeed, in my view, the result
of “duck, avoid, and evade” was a bench that seemed to be more reticent
about the exercise of judicial power at all than were prior generations of
judges. This was a passive judiciary, even timid, all the more extraordinary for being the first independent judiciary in the world.30
And these tendencies cut across the appointing president, the party affiliation, and so
on.31

29. Nancy Gertner, Opinions I Should Have Written, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 423, 428 (2016).
30. Id. at 426–27.
31. Even when courts do not “duck, avoid, and evade,” when they engage with the issues
on the merits, too often, rather than considering new constitutional concepts and new
applications, they excuse constitutional violations as harmless or narrow their application
anticipating that that is the direction in which a more conservative Supreme Court is likely to
go. Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921
(2016).
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This was not appropriate judicial restraint, as the concept is usually understood.32
What I saw were pressures to avoid principled decision making of any kind, to avoid
making the kind of reasoned judgments with which common law judges were supposed to be involved.
There are many explanations for this, which I have offered in other articles.33
There are caseload pressures, or at the least, the appearance of caseload pressures.
Caseload pressure leads to what has been described as “managerial judging,” where
judging privileges moving cases and engaging in dispute resolution, rather than generating common law decisions.34 Since the concern for efficiency provides the incentive for judges to eschew writing opinions, unless they have to as a matter of law, as
in the case of the grant of summary judgment, a body of law evolves which is onesided, asymmetric. As I describe it, with reference to Title VII law:
When the defendant successfully moves for summary judgment in a
discrimination case, the case is over. [Under the Rules], the judge must
“state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion,”
which means writing a decision. But when the plaintiff wins, the judge
typically writes a single word of endorsement—“denied”—and the case
moves on to trial. . . .
The result of this practice—written decisions only when plaintiffs
lose—is the evolution of a one-sided body of law. Decision after decision
grants summary judgment to the defendant . . . . After the district court
has described—cogently and persuasively, perhaps even for publication—why the plaintiff loses, the case may or may not be appealed. If it
is not, it stands as yet another compelling account of a flawed discrimination claim. If it is appealed, the odds are good that the circuit court will
affirm the district court’s pessimistic assessment of the plaintiff’s case.35
Over time, the way judges view these cases changes: “If case after case recites the
facts that do not amount to discrimination, it is no surprise that the decision makers
have a hard time envisioning the facts that may well comprise discrimination. Worse,
they may come to believe that most claims are trivial.”36 Even statistics about judicial

32. Bickel, for example, characterized judicial restraint as avoiding constitutional
questions with which the country was not yet ready to deal. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 133–43 (2d ed. 1986).
33. Nancy Gertner, The Judicial Repeal of the Johnson/Kennedy Administration’s
“Signature” Achievement, in A NATION OF WIDENING OPPORTUNITIES: THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
AT 50, at 165–83 (Ellen D. Katz & Samuel R. Bagenstos eds., 2015); Nancy Gertner, Losers’
Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 116–23 (2012), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf
/1111_aau9fyvc.pdf [hereinafter Gertner, Losers’ Rules]; Gertner, supra note 29.
34. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (describing the
extent to which the judge was a manager and pointing out the negative consequences of that
approach).
35. Gertner, Losers’ Rules, supra note 33, at 113–14.
36. Id. at 115. Similar observations have been made about criminal sentencing,
Margaret Truesdale, Note, Pro-Prosecution Doctrinal Drift in Criminal Sentencing, 111
NW. U. L. REV. 1131 (2017), and about case load pressures in appellate dockets, Martin K.
Levy, Judging Justice on Appeal, 123 YALE L.J. 2386, 2386 (2014) (noting that the cases
receiving less attention than others are social security cases, prisoner cases, and criminal
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decision making—the reports required by the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 that
list motions pending over six months and cases over three years37—affect substantive
outcomes.38 As Professor Harold Koh described: “When you cannot measure what is
important, you tend to make important what you can measure.”39 Concerns about the
costs of litigation and delay have become far more important than concerns about
access to justice.
Another explanation for the evolution of discrimination and civil rights law,
however, may be context—the changing political and social context in which civil
rights claims are heard. An asymmetric decision-making process—formal opinions
in civil rights cases only when the plaintiff loses—leads to decision rules that
provide a blueprint for the judge to grant summary judgment or dismiss a complaint
in case after case. Over time, the decisional law evolves, in this case narrowing the
statute’s reach to cases of intentional discrimination. That understanding of the law
maps onto what may be a prevailing political view, namely that that the market
was working fairly, for the most part, that the country was post-race and postgender. The focus of the civil rights law was to identify the aberrant individuals who
did not get the antidiscrimination message and fewer and fewer cases met that test.
I would suggest that the early Title VII cases, decided in the context of the civil
rights demonstrations and beatings of the 1960s and the women’s rights movement
of the 1970s, provided a different context and led to different outcomes. To be sure,
many of the cases were blatant—explicit discrimination in the job descriptions of
help wanted ads and explicit comments by employers—and that shaped the courts’
understanding of the issues. The media was filled with narrative of discrimination.
The market was plainly not working; it was discriminating against women and minorities in overt ways. What Susan Sturm has described as “second generation”
discrimination40 is more subtle and complex—a pattern of interaction among
groups that operates over time to exclude minorities and is difficult to trace to the
intentional actions of aberrant actors. But today’s context—the belief that the
problems of race and gender have been solved and that cost and delay are more
important than access to justice—provides a disincentive for judges to probe very
deeply into the case, let alone to give the plaintiffs time and meaningful discovery
to prove their case.

cases, which the author describes as cases brought by parties who are arguably the most
vulnerable); see also Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1116–33
(2011) (comparing circuit courts with suddenly high docket loads to those with normal
docket loads and the impact on different categories of cases).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 476 (2012).
38. See Miguel de Figueiredo, Alexandra D. Lahav & Peter Siegelman, Against Judicial
Accountability: Evidence From the Six Month List (Feb. 25, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2989777 [https://perma.cc/DR7S-UWC5] (finding
that plaintiffs win a smaller fraction of cases that close just before the six-month list is
compiled).
39. Harold Hongju Koh, The Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive Determination of Every
Action?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1525, 1529 (2014).
40. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001).
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JUDGING IN A TIME OF TRUMP
After the election of President Trump, I was concerned not only about what the
President did—the executive orders that he enacted—but also about the official conduct he enabled and even encouraged. The media reported changes in the way border
officials dealt with noncitizens.41 To an audience of police officers, the President
seemed to endorse police brutality.42 I predicted a plethora of cases raising civil rights
and discrimination claims against post-Trump government officials, not just the big
cases, the ones that garner amicus briefs and media attention like the travel ban, but
the little cases in the cities and towns of our country, the cases that were a federal
court’s regular fare. At the same time I was pessimistic about the extent to which
courts would serve as a meaningful backstop to official abuse, given what I had observed in my tenure. I was pessimistic even as the need for robust judicial review
was even more urgent. This was so not simply because of the failure of checks and
balances in the usual sense—one-party control of Congress and the Presidency. It
was so because of the media reports that other checks were being undermined—an
independent civil service,43 a relatively independent Department of Justice.44
But now I am not so certain about the courts. I began to believe that to some
degree—I don’t want to overstate this—“judging in a time of Trump” has a different
resonance than when I was on the bench. It was one thing to duck, avoid, and evade
when you believe that the system is working, when official actors are acting more or
less within legal and constitutional bounds. It is another to do so when you are concerned about real overreach at all executive levels. Typically, judges deal with “slippery slope” arguments in connection with judicial line drawing, “that a particular act
[or judicial line], seemingly innocuous when taken in isolation may yet lead to a
future host of similar but increasingly pernicious events.”45 We believe that the slope
will inevitably slide to an unwelcome point because we lack the confidence that future courts or political actors will be able to stop it, hence we narrow the relevant
principle in the first instance. Post-Trump we fear an executive slippery slope. If
government actors are permitted to do this, if we exercise our discretion to permit an
overbroad, constitutionally infirm travel ban, for example—if courts do not draw the
line here, what other behavior will courts privilege? And given this administration’s

41. E.g., Jonathan Blitzer, The Border Patrol Was Primed for President Trump, NEW
YORKER (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-border-patrolwas-primed-for-president-trump [https://perma.cc/79FS-352B].
42. Jelani Cobb, Donald Trump Is Serious When He “Jokes” About Police Brutality, NEW
YORKER (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/donald-trump-isserious-when-he-jokes-about-police-brutality [https://perma.cc/VQ8X-2EG9].
43. See Landon R. Y. Storrs, The Ugly History Behind Trump’s Attacks on Civil Servants,
POLITICO MAG. (Mar. 26, 2017), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/historytrump-attacks-civil-service-federal-workers-mccarthy-214951
[https://perma.cc/AUY9RBF5].
44. See Sally Q. Yates, Opinion, Sally Yates: Protect the Justice Department from
President Trump, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07
/28/opinion/sally-yates-protect-the-justice-department-from-president-trump.html
[https://
perma.cc/WP3G-VMKH].
45. Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 361–62 (1985).
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statements, we are less than confident that calmer heads (let alone constitutional
scholars) will prevail.
To be sure, the travel ban cases may be sui generis. While even here the lower
courts had many grounds to duck—there were standing challenges and challenges to
the extent of the irreparable harm, and there was also the option to defer to the executive on national security and immigration at an early stage in the litigation—they
did not. In part, it may have been the history of the litigation—a hastily drafted first
executive order that was clearly overbroad, the record of incendiary campaign rhetoric which was still fresh in the minds of the courts. Executive orders in year two or
three of this administration may be looked at differently. The run-of-the-mill discrimination or police abuse case, against customs officials emboldened by the President’s
remarks about immigration may fit into the old patterns. And one reaction to the
President’s attack on judges may be to seek to prove their neutrality by bending over
backwards to sustain official acts. It would be a version of what Robert Cover wrote
about in Justice Accused, describing the Northern antislavery judges who enforced
the Fugitive Slave Act with a rigor that was not required by the law. He called it
“judicial can’t.”46
THE IMPLICATIONS
These challenges make it all the more important to address the “duck, avoid, and
evade” doctrines, when they are inappropriate. It is especially critical to dramatize
the fact that these doctrines are not just commendable judicial restraint, but the undermining of access to justice. And it is critical to emphasize the special importance
of court access “in a time of Trump.” More than legal analysis, we should look to
new tools to evaluate the courts. The same statistical methods that lead judges to
“duck, avoid, and evade,” lest their six month reports compare unfavorably with their
peers, can be deployed to identify troubling patterns in access to justice. We can use
empirical tools to identify the judges who literally dismiss all civil rights cases, who
have never seen an excessive force civil rights case pass muster, to remind them that
they are in fact exercising discretion and making judgments in one direction and one
direction only.
A prominent civil rights law firm in Atlanta, for example, commissioned a study
of employment discrimination cases in the Northern District of Georgia over a twoyear period.47 While there were limits to the study, some of the results were staggering. Of 181 cases in which the plaintiff had counsel, the court dismissed 95% of them
at least in part, and 81% of the cases in full. Racial hostile work environment cases
were dismissed 100% of the time. Data broken down per judge revealed that some
judges had dismissed all discrimination cases in the two-year period and that when a
magistrate judge recommended dismissal, the judge followed the recommendation
100% of the time. Data also suggested that white defendants alleging reverse discrimination had a better success rate than black plaintiffs alleging discrimination.

46. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 119–23 (1975).
47. AMANDA FARAHANY & TANYA MCADAMS, BARRETT & FARAHANY, ANALYSIS OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS FOR CASES IN WHICH AN ORDER WAS ISSUED ON
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 2011 AND 2012 IN THE U.S. DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA (2013).
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Likewise, judicial training is critical to underscore the fact that apparently neutral
doctrines promoting efficiency and cutting costs have substantive impacts.
With respect to the academic literature—including this Symposium—academics
must stop speaking in tongues, must make their insights more available to judges and
practitioners, must write for a larger audience about the implications of judicial opinions. In Centola v. Potter,48 I held that since discrimination was, at core, about
stereotyping men (she is not a “real woman” because she is too mannish; he is not a
“real man” because he is effeminate), it surely should include discrimination on the
basis of sexual preference. The idea was not original with me. It derived from an
article written years before by Professor Sylvia Law of New York University, whose
work I had followed.49 The Seventh Circuit has recently taken a similar position,
after numbers of amicus briefs and guidance from the EEOC.50 That public mobilization communicates the context to the court and the circumstances in which judgment is exercised.
To be sure, this administration will be able to fill a substantial number of judicial
vacancies, perhaps with judges who would resolve these issues more deferential to
official overreach, although “duck, avoid, and evade” characterized judicial appointees of all stripes. The challenge is to change that calculus—to make the context
clear—no matter who the incumbent is.

48. 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 413 (D. Mass. 2002).
49. Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WISC. L. REV.
187. Professor Law argues that disapprobation of homosexual behavior is a reaction to the
violation of gender norms, that is, traditional concepts of masculinity and femininity, rather
than merely scorn for homosexual practices. Id.
50. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017).

